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COMMENT
THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO
BAIL AND THE CIVIL PLAINTIFF IN
LANDAU v. VALLEN: ATTACHMENT
UBER ALLES?
Although there is no express constitutional right to bail,' a
"traditional right" has been recognized and enforced by the
courts,2 either through the Bail Reform Act of 19841 or state bail
I See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 546 (1952) ("the very language of the [Eighth]
Amendment fails to say all arrests must be bailable"); see also Sellers v. United States, 89 S.
Ct. 36, 38 (Black, Circuit Justice 1968) ("[t]he command of the Eighth Amendment... at
the very least obligates judges passing upon the right to bail to deny such relief only for the
strongest of reasons").
The only reference to bail in the United States Constitution is found in the eighth
amendment, which states that "excessive bail shall not be required." See U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. Some commentators insist that the excessive bail clause implies a constitution-
ally recognized right to bail. See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U.
PA. L. REV. 959, 970 (1965); see also Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in
the World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 397 (1970).
The Court in Carlson, however, asserted that the reference to bail in the Constitution
"has not prevented Congress from defining the classes of cases in which bail shall be allowed
in this country." See 342 U.S. at 545. The Court supported this statement by referring to
the English Bill of Rights Act, the model statute for the eighth amendment. See id. The
English Bill of Rights Act has always been thought to provide that "bail shall not be exces-
sive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail." Id. The Court noted that when the
eighth amendment was adopted, "nothing was said that indicated any different concept."
Id. But cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956). In Griffin, the Court made broad state-
ments implying that the fourteenth amendment's due process and equal protection clauses
extend to criminal trial procedure. See id. The Court stated that "[b]oth equal protection
and due process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged
with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241
(1940)).
2 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951): In Stack, Chief Justice Vinson noted that
"[t]his traditional right to freedom before conviction" has been in the American criminal
justice system since the Judiciary Act of 1789, and that "federal law has unequivocally pro-
vided that a person arrested for a non-capital offense shall be admitted to bail." Id. (em-
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phasis in original); see also Herzog v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 349, 351 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice 1955) ("[b]ail is basic to our system of law"); United States ex rel. Siegal v. Follette,
290 F. Supp. 632, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (there exists "fundamental right" to bail which is
constitutional but not absolute); U.S. TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 37 (President's
Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Admin. of Just. 1967) [hereinafter U.S. TASK FORCE]
("[m]oney bail" is "traditional practice"). See generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 2D § 762, at 106-09 (2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1990) (discussing nature of
right to bail).
In discussing the right to bail, the Court in Stack cited Rule 46(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. See 342 U.S. at 4 (under Rule 46(a), "person arrested for a non-
capital offense shall be admitted to bail"). Rule 46(a) has since been modified. See C.
WRIGHT, supra, § 762 (Supp. 1990) (securing appearance of defendant and protecting safety
of community should be considered in determining bail). The right to bail continues to be a
strong and important one. See Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 665 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice 1962) (ball is "important" part of criminal justice system). This right, however, is
certainly not as automatic as Chief Justice Vinson urged in 1951. See id. at 668; see also
United States v. Gilbert, 425 F.2d 490, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (right to bail not absolute);
Allen v. United States, 386 F.2d 634, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("no accused is automatically
entitled to release"); United States v. Provenzano, 578 F. Supp. 119, 120 (E.D. La.) (right to
bail in non-capital case "is not absolute"), aff'd, 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1983).
The right to bail has been described as "discretionary." See Carbo, 82 S. Ct. at 667
(quoting Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280, 283 (2d Cir. 1950)); United States v.
Hudson, 65 F. 68, 73 (W.D. Ark. 1894). Similarly, at common law bail was not considered an
absolute right. See United States v. Delaney, 8 F. Supp. 224, 225 (D.N.J. 1934) (according to
common law, "bail should . . . never be a matter of right"). Nevertheless, bail should be
denied only under the most compelling of circumstances. See Fernandez v. United States,
81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (Harlan, Circuit Justice 1961) (only when "appropriate to the orderly
progress of the trial and the fair administration of justice"); Gilbert, 425 F.2d at 491 ("if
necessary to insure orderly trial processes"); Provenzano, 578 F. Supp. at 121 (should be
denied only under "extreme or unusual" circumstances (quoting Carbo, 82 S. Ct. at 668)).
The question of whether the defendant has a right to bail arises throughout the crimi-
nal process. See C. WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 14.3, at 223 (1978).
The issue arises initially upon indictment, at which time there is a strong presumption in
favor of release. See United States v. Bentvena, 288 F.2d 442, 444 (2d Cir. 1961) ("until trial
commences, enlargement on bail is the rule"). During trial, "the right to bail is necessarily
circumscribed by other pressing considerations." Id. After conviction, but pending appeal,
the defendant has the burden of establishing that he "will not flee or pose a danger to any
other person or to the community." FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c).
- 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1988). The Bail Reform Act of 1984 ("1984 Act") is the suc-
cessor statute to the Bail Reform Act of 1966 ("1966 Act"). See Powers III, Detention
Under the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 413, 413 (1985) (1984 Act
changed philosophy established under 1966 Act). The 1966 Act favored pretrial release on
one's own recognizance over financial bail, in recognition of the problems the indigent have
in securing bail. See, e.g., United States v. Cowper, 349 F. Supp. 560, 564 (N.D. Ohio 1972)
(bail bond "to be used as a last resort"); United States v. Gillin, 345 F. Supp. 1145, 1147
(S.D. Tex. 1972) (monetary bail "least desired condition because it discriminates against the
poor"). But see Powers III, supra, at 414. "Among the many criticisms of the 1966 [Act]
were that it failed to provide for appropriate release conditions and encouraged a dispropor-
tionate use of money bonds, resulting in the unnecessary pretrial incarceration of poor de-
fendants." Id. See generally U.S. TASK FORCE, supra note 2, at 37-38 (discussing inadequacy
of bail and effects on indigent); L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 51-54 (1977) (criticizing
effects of money bail on accused).
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legislation.4 The primary purpose of bail is to secure the appear-
ance of the defendant at trial,5 and courts have held that any
amount beyond that required to ensure the defendant's appear-
ance is "excessive."'6 The policy underlying the accused's right to
The 1984 Act's scope reached beyond the 1966 Act's emphasis on assuring a defendant's
appearance at trial, and embraced considerations of society's protection from dangerous
criminals. See Powers HI, supra, at 414 (tenor of 1984 Act addresses "problems of safety of
the community or of other persons"); see also 6 L. ORFIELD, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
UNDER THE FEDERAL RuLEs § 46:42, at 181-82 (2d ed. 1987) (under 1984 Act, "pretrial deten-
tion is proper where the defendant is charged with certain felonies ... and there are no
release conditions which will protect the community from the defendant"). Rule 46 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets the 1984 Act into motion. Id. § 46:43, at 182.
4 See C. WHiTEBREAD, supra note 2, § 14.1, at 222. Forty states specifically provide in
their constitutions for a right to bail. Id. State bail statutes apply to actions brought under
state law while federal ball statutes apply where there has been a violation of federal law.
See Sun Indem. Co. v. United States, 91 F.2d 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1937) (where defendant
violated federal law and failed to appear, action by surety to recover ball is governed not by
New Jersey law, but by bail provisions of federal statute); see also United States v.
D'Argento, 227 F. Supp. 596, 603 (N.D. Ill.) (federal law, not state law, governs bail bonds in
federal court), rev'd on other grounds, 339 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1964).
5 See, e.g., Stack, 342 U.S. at 5. "Like the ancient practice of securing the oaths of
responsible persons to stand as sureties for the accused, the modern practice of requiring a
bail bond or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture serves as additional assur-
ance of the presence of an accused." Id.; see Brown v. United States, 392 F.2d 189, 190 (5th
Cir. 1968) (bail conditions are for "sole purpose" of assuring defendant's presence at trial);
United States v. Gotay, 609 F. Supp. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("central objective" of bail is
to assure defendant's trial appearance); Reddy v. Snepp, 357 F. Supp. 999, 1003 (W.D.N.C.
1973) (bail "required for one reason more important than all the other reasons-to assure,
or at least make it highly likely, that the accused or convicted defendant will show up for
trial or service of sentence").
The courts have been just as careful in indicating the purposes bail does not serve. See,
e.g., United States v. Kirkman, 426 F.2d 747, 752 (4th Cir. 1970) (not to enrich government
or punish accused); Paris v. United States, 137 F.2d 300, 302 (4th Cir. 1943) (not to enrich
treasury); United States v. Foster, 79 F. Supp. 422, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ("not. , . to pre-
vent the commission of crimes between indictment and trial").
The 1984 Act set forth an additional purpose of bail with respect to certain types of
criminals. See supra note 3 (discussion of Bail Reform Act). Criminals deemed to be partic-
ularly violent or involved in certain drug offenses have been deemed presumptively non-
releasable in an effort to protect society from the likelihood that they will commit more
crime if released. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(g) (1988); see also United States v. Baker, 703 F.
Supp. 34, 35 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (reason for denial of bail "may be... the safety of others").
See generally Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals, 74 GEo. L.J. 499, 660-68 (1986) (discussing government's rec-
ognition of alarming number of crimes committed by persons out on bail and attempt to
help solve problem through 1984 Act).
I Stack, 342 U.S. at 5; see United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92, 98 (2d Cir.) (bail should
be set in such amount "as 'will insure the presence of the defendant' ") (quoting Fed. R.
Crim. P. 46(c))), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 894 (1951); United States v. Accardi, 241 F. Supp.
119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (bail should not be onerous, but should be sufficient to ensure
defendant's presence). Courts setting bail have considered a variety of factors over the
years, but have focused fairly consistently on the defendant's ability to pay and the atrocity
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bail is premised on the presumption of that person's innocence. 7
Historically, courts have considered the purpose of and policy be-
hind bail to be so important that they generally have prohibited
any external8 or even internal9 interference with bail by present or
of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1835) (No.
15, 577). Other considerations include: likelihood of flight, see Carbo v. United States, 82 S.
Ct. 662, 666 (Douglas, Circuit Justice 1962); danger to the community, see Provenzano, 578
F. Supp. at 121-22 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1983); and, repetition of of-
fenses, see Carbo, 82 S. Ct. at 666, In sum, the question of bail is to be determined in "light
of all the circumstances." Bobick v. Schaeffer, 366 F. Supp. 503, 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
See Stack, 342 U.S. at 4. "Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the pre-
sumption of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning." Id.;
see also Glynn v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 1972) (presumption of innocence exists
prior to and during trial). But see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). In Bell, the
Court stated, in dictum, that the presumption of innocence "has no application to a deter-
mination of the rights of a pretrial detainee during confinement before his trial has even
begun." Id.
The use of bail as a device for keeping persons in jail may have severe due process
consequences. C. WHrrEBREAD, supra note 2, § 14.5, at 226. A detained defendant "faces
grave difficulties in preparing his defense, ranging from [an] inability to locate witnesses to
difficulty in contacting his counsel." Id. Indeed, statistics show that the conviction rate for
pretrial detainees is significantly higher than for those released. See Rankin, The Effect of
Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 641, 643 (1964) (study "shows that defendants in jail
were twenty percent more likely to receive convictions than were defendants on bail").
' See United States v. Widen, 38 F.2d 517, 518-19 (N.D. Ill. 1930) ("no theory upon
which a stranger to the record may intervene" in federal criminal court to recover defend-
ant's bail bonds in equity action). The Widen court observed that the common law did not
recognize this interference. Id. at 518. Further, the court was unable to find a federal law in
derogation of the rule at common law, and thus held that the common law governed. Id. at
519; cf. Bucher v. Vance, 36 F.2d 774, 775 (7th Cir. 1929) (trend in federal decisions is to
deny attachment of court-held funds by another court).
Even the government has been forbidden from interfering with a defendant's bail for
the satisfaction of a judgment in its favor in a civil suit. See, e.g., United States v. Badger,
711 F. Supp. 1008, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (IRS unsuccessful in attempt to levy upon defend-
ant's bail). The Badger court stated that "the IRS levy 'impermissibly threatens the institu-
tional integrity of the Judicial Branch."' Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 383 (1989)).
See, e.g., Corporation Co. v. Mikelis, 467 F. Supp. 826, 828 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (bail bond
attachment by civil plaintiff denied due to "important judicial and governmental interests
to be served by the retention of a cost bond and an appearance bond"); Reed Mktg. Corp. v.
Diversified Mktg., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 125, 126 (N.D. IM. 1976) (bail attachment by plaintiff
refused). The Reed court believed "the transformation of the federal courts into collection
agencies for judgment creditors would impede the judicial function." Id. But see Bankers'
Mortgage Co. v. McComb, 60 F.2d 218, 220-21 (10th Cir. 1932) (attorneys permitted to at-
tach bail for fees); Bank of Hawaii v. Benchwick, 249 F. Supp. 74, 83 (D. Haw. 1966) (at-
tachment permitted where defendant admitted bail "was at all times the property" of
plaintiff).
Traditionally, absent a statute to the contrary, not even fines have been permitted to be
satisfied from bail funds. See United States v. Neely, 178 F. 748, 749 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910).
In the past, however, federal bail statutes authorized courts to satisfy a fine by taking cash
paid by the defendant in lieu of bail. See, e.g., Widen, 38 F.2d at 518-19 (former 18 U.S.C.A.
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potential creditors, whether the bail was provided by the defend-
ant or a third party surety.10 Recently, however, in Landau v. Val-
len,11 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the alleged victim of a criminal defendant's conduct may,
in a related civil proceeding, attach the defendant's assets posted
as bail if the plaintiff can demonstrate "a reasonable nexus be-
tween [his] losses and the crimes alleged."1 2
In Landau, the defendant, Frank Shannon, was indicted, ad-
mitted to bail, tried, and convicted of federal securities fraud viola-
tions.1 3 He was later sued civilly in the United States District
§ 591 interpreted to include cash deposits for bail as well as common law bail of security
bonds); People ex rel. Gilbert v. Laidlaw, 102 N.Y. 588, 591-92, 7 N.E. 910, 912-13 (1886)
(former 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 568, 586-590 explained); see also infra notes 63-64 and accompany-
ing text (discussion of distinction between bail and cash paid in lieu of bail).
Currently, however, using bail money to satisfy criminal fines is considered improper by
nearly all courts which have addressed the issue. See Cohen v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 526,
528 (Douglass, Circuit Justice 1962) (purpose of bail is not for fines, and its use for such
unintended purpose would render bail "'excessive' in the sense of the Eighth Amend-
ment"); United States v. Rose, 791 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1986) (to use bail money for
fine payment "is for a purpose other than that for which bail is required to be given under
the Eighth Amendment" and "contrary to the provisions of the Bail Reform Act"); United
States v. Powell, 639 F.2d 224, 225 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (criminal fines assessed in
criminal action not to be taken from defendant's bail because satisfaction of fines is beyond
bail's purpose); United States v. Davis, 47 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (bail not avail-
able for fines from same action because obligation of surety fulfilled), af'd, 135 F.2d 1013
(2d Cir. 1943). But see Ward v. United States, 845 F.2d 1459, 1461 (7th Cir. 1988). In Ward,
a valid statute authorized fines to be taken from a defendant's cash bail. Id. The Ward
court stated that the "dual purpose" of a bail bond is "to increase the cost to the defendant
of failing to appear for trial, and to provide security for the payment of costs and fines in
the event of conviction." Id.
11 See 6 L. ORFIELD, supra note 3, at 152. Bail, under the common law, required that
some third party, such as a friend, relative, or bondsman deposit a bond with the court with
which he would assure the defendant's presence at trial. See id. The "bail," the one who has
promised to pay the court in the event of the defendant's nonappearance, was responsible
for the defendant's compliance with the bail bond. See id. The former Code of Criminal
Procedure allowed a defendant to deposit cash in lieu of bail, thereby enabling the defend-
ant to be responsible for himself. See, e.g., Gilbert, 102 N.Y. at 591, 7 N.E. at 912 (former
federal bail statute permitted defendant to have cash deposited with court, rather than bail
bond). It has since been held that "cash bail" may be deposited by the defendant. See
Widen, 38 F.2d at 518 (since bail "not limited to common-law bail," court may not "refuse a
deposit by the accused in cash of the amount of bail required"). Hence, the "bail" aspect of
a release on bail technically has lost its meaning. See M. TORIAs & R. PETER EN, PRE-TRIAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 319-20 (1972).
11 895 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 897.
" Landau v. Vallen, 723 F. Supp. 218, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), rev'd, 895 F.2d 888 (2d Cir.
1990). The defendant had been employed by Haas Securities Corporation, as a broker-
dealer, in the company's New York office. See Attachment of Bail Refused to Plaintiffs in
Civil Fraud Suit, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 1989, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Attachment of Bail].
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Court for the Southern District of New York by the plaintiff, So-
lange Landau, for related conduct."' The defendant, an English
domiciliary, 15 pled guilty to the criminal charges" and received a
suspended sentence and a $10,000 fine.17 Bail originally had been
set at $10 million, of which Shannon paid $3.5 million in cash out
of his own funds.'8 The court subsequently reduced bail to
$350,000.19 While the criminal action against Shannon was still
pending, Landau added Shannon to a civil suit against Haas Se-
curities Corporation and others, for, inter alia, securities fraud and
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act.20 Subsequent to Shannon's conviction but prior to his sen-
tencing, Landau moved in district court for an order to attach
Shannon's posted bail of $350,000.21 The district court granted
Landau an ex parte temporary restraining order prohibiting the
return of Shannon's bail pending the court's decision on the mo-
tion.2 1 Shannon had already been sentenced by the time the dis-
trict court reached the merits of Landau's motion and, accordingly,
Shannon would have been entitled to a release of his bail but for
the temporary restraining order.23 The district court denied plain-
24tiff's motion, concluding that a civil plaintiff could not attach a
criminal defendant's bail in a related proceeding because to do so
would undermine the purpose of bail.2"
14 Landau, 895 F.2d at 890. The Southern District of New York was also the situs of
the criminal action. Id.
'" See Attachment of Bail, supra note 13. The defendant, originally from England, was
granted permission to return to his native land notwithstanding his suspended sentence. Id.
Landau, 895 F.2d at 890.
1 Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 218. Shannon was charged of securities fraud for filing a
false and fraudulent form 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id.
18 Landau, 895 F.2d at 890.
19 Id. The $350,000 was the only asset Shannon had in the United States. Id.
20 Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 218. In her complaint, Landau asserted that "Shannon and
others conspired to defraud her of millions of dollars." Landau, 895 F.2d at 890. It was also
alleged by Landau that Shannon pled guilty as part of the conspiracy. Id.
21 Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 218.
22 Id. at 219.
23 Id.
2 Id. at 220. The district court, upon denying Landau's motion, stayed release of Shan-
non's funds for 10 days to permit appeal. Id.
"1 Id. The district court, acknowledging that the purpose of ball for this defendant had
been fulfilled, stated that the troublesome aspect of such a rule would be its effect on future
defendants. Id. Under such a rule, the district court predicted a reduction of a defendant's
incentive to return to trial and an increased difficulty in obtaining bail bonds. Id. The dis-
trict court believed that, on the whole, bail attachment would be "unwise." Id. Moreover,
the court asserted that any other decision would be contrary to the "general rule" against
[Vol. 64:651
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed,26 rejecting the district
court's per se rule against bail attachment.2 Writing for the court,
Justice Tenney, sitting by designation, 28 explained that the need to
assist a civil plaintiff by permitting attachment of a criminal de-
fendant's bail outweighed the government's obligation to return
the defendant's posted funds once the purpose for bail no longer
existed.29 Notwithstanding the effects such a rule might have on
future defendants, 0 the Second Circuit reasoned that to proscribe
attachment would be to provide criminal defendants with a "'safe
harbor' while bail funds were in the custody of the court, [and]
also 'safe passage' in and out of the court's jurisdiction." 31 Al-
though it recognized that New York law permits "prejudgment at-
tachment of a foreign defendant's assets,"32 the court nonetheless
concluded that attachment of a criminal defendant's bail was only
available to civil plaintiffs who purportedly were victims of the de-
fendant's criminal conduct.33 Relying on Jacobson v. Hahn, 4 the
bail attachment. Id. at 219.
20 Landau, 895 F.2d at 897.
217 Id. at 892-93. The case was remanded to the district court for a decision on the mer-
its. Id. at 897.
28 Id. at 889. Justice Tenney normally sits with the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. Id.
29 Id. at 890. The court noted that under the facts of this case, since Shannon had been
sentenced and did not appeal his conviction, the purpose of bail had been satisfied. Id. at
897 n.6. The court cautioned, however, that in a case where the purpose of bail had not yet
been accomplished, those seeking attachment should probably notify the government in
light of the government's continued interest in having the money held in court. Id. It should
be noted that the court did not forbid attachment at such time, but merely suggested "it
might be beneficial to have the Government's input on the issue." Id.
20 Id. at 890, 892. The district court recognized that the "the purpose of bail with re-
spect to... [Shannon] has been accomplished," but urged that the effect of such a rule goes
beyond the instant defendant. Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 220. The Second Circuit acknowl-
edged the district court's worries regarding the decrease in the defendant's incentive and
the increase in the difficulty of meeting bail, finding them to be "legitimate causes for con-
cern." Landau, 895 F.2d at 890. Notwithstanding these "legitimate" concerns, however, the
Second Circuit felt obliged to reverse the district court. Id.
21 Landau, 895 F,2d at 891. In an attempt to take the district court's per se denial of
bail attachment to its logical conclusion, the Second Circuit argued that a foreign defendant
could transport assets in and out of the United States to post for bail and thereby defraud
his creditors. Id.
2 Id. (citing N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6201(1) (McKinney 1980)). The court maintained
that New York courts traditionally have been "reluctant to undermine" the purposes of
attachment. Id. The court stated that "absent the most compelling circumstances, which we
do not find in this case, we would be reluctant to derogate a right so unequivocally em-
braced by New York's courts." Id.
23 Id. at 890.
s' 88 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1937). In Jacobson, a similar result to the Second Circuit's deci-
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court espoused an omnipotent view of attachment.15 In an attempt
to make its rule appear less severe, the Landau court set forth sev-
eral other instances in which a defendant's bail could be for-
feited .3  The court also maintained that the doctrine of custodia
legis3 7 did not bar the attachment of bail when a court, in its dis-
cretion, deems it proper to do so.35
The Landau decision will be met with great approval by civil
plaintiffs seeking an easy route for attachment.39 It is submitted,
sion in Landau was reached at the district court level. See Jacobson v. Hahn, 14 F. Supp.
339, 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1936), modified, 88 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1937). The district court's decision
in Jacobson was subsequently modified on appeal, resulting in an outcome contrary to that
of Landau. 88 F.2d at 433. The Jacobson decision was arrived at in light of Section 15 of the
former 6 U.S.C.A., which was then in effect. Id. at 434; see also supra note 10 (discussing
former bail statutes). The Second Circuit in Landau also relied on Gilbert v. Laidlaw, 102
N.Y. 588, 590, 7 N.E. 910, 912 (1886). Landau, 895 F.2d at 892. The Gilbert court similarly
had the old bail statutes to guide its decision. Gilbert, 102 N.Y. at 590, 7 N.E. at 912; see
also supra note 9 (discussing bail and fines).
. 35 See Landau, 895 F.2d at 897 ("the door to attachment of bail has always been
open").
36 See id. at 892. The court cited, by way of example, the following cases to demon-
strate the ways in which bail can be forfeited, absent the defendant's nonappearance at
trial: United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 900 (1st Cir. 1987)
(defendant posted drug money as bail, which fact was determined at special pretrial hear-
ing); Kelly v. Springett, 527 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975) (drug offender had not yet
posted bail when state entity levied bank account for unpaid taxes, and state bail statute
was held to apply); Jacobson, 88 F.2d at 435 (using cash in lieu of bail or fines dictated by
statute); United States v. One Single Family Residence, 683 F. Supp. 783, 786 (S.D. Fla.
1988) (home purchased with drug money posted as security for bail); Midland Ins. Co. v
Friedgood, 649 F. Supp. 239, 242-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (funds used for bail had been fraudu-
lently conveyed out of country to defendant's mistress, and IRS sought lien); Bank of Ha-
waii v. Benchwick, 249 F. Supp. 74, 81-83 (D. Haw. 1966) (defendant fraudulently obtained
money from plaintiff and used it as bail); Gilbert, 102 N.Y. at 591-92, 7 N.E. at 912-13
(statute prescribed using cash in lieu of bail or fines).
"' The doctrine of custodia legis is a traditionally-recognized immunity from attach-
ment for funds held in a court's registry. See 7 J. MOORE, J. LuCAS & K. SINCLAIR, MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 67.06 (1989) (funds deposited in court not subject to attachment by
another or same federal court). Funds in custodia legis are funds which have been deposited
with the court's clerk for a particular purpose and essentially are being "held in trust.., to
be delivered to whom [they] may belong, after hearing and adjudication by the court." The
Lottawanna, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 201, 224, (1873); see also Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 20, 21, (1846) (holding that money owed to seamen in hands of government vessel was
not subject to attachment by creditors). The rationale underlying the custodia legis doctrine
is that "the proceeds... are not by law in the hands of the clerk nor of the judge, nor is the
fund subject to the control of the clerk." The Lottawanna, 87 U.S. at 224.
38 Landau, 895 F.2d at 896. Apparently relying on dictum set forth in Bank of Hawaii,
249 F. Supp. at 81-82, the Landau court concluded that any limitation on attachment of
funds in custodia legis is subject to the rule that "[tihe Clerk's authority to dispose of assets
in its registry is dictated by the court it serves." Landau, 895 F.2d at 896.
"' See Bank of Hawaii, 249 F. Supp. at 80 (alternative to attachment would have victim
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however, that the Landau court has seriously undermined the fun-
damental purpose of bail, which is to secure a defendant's presence
at trial.4" If bail is subject to prejudgment attachment, it is sug-
gested that bail's effectiveness as an incentive for the defendant to
appear is lost, because posted funds could be forfeited regardless of
the defendant's presence at trial. Furthermore, it is asserted that
the Landau court's position smacks of punishment, since the in-
creased risk of forfeiture will undoubtedly result in an increase in
the amount of bail required to ensure the defendant's appearaice.
Thus, in its noble effort to aid a civil plaintiff, it is suggested that
the Landau court denigrated the fundamental objective of bail and
the defendant's right to its return upon satisfaction of the bail
agreement's conditions.
This Comment will examine the Landau decision in light of
the conflicting policies of bail and attachment, and suggest that
the Landau court has departed from a general regard for the sanc-
tity of bail. In addition, it will be submitted that the court's deci-
sion overlooked the contractual nature of bail. Further, it will be
asserted that the court relied on cases whose fact patterns are
clearly distinguishable from the facts and circumstances presented
in Landau, and as a result, misinterpreted the custodia legis doc-
trine. Finally, this Comment will discuss the ramifications of the
Second Circuit's extension of New York's attachment statutes to
federally prescribed bail 'and conclude that this extension is both
erroneous and destructive to the criminal justice system, and inter-
feres with the protection an accused person's right to bail provides.
I. THE PURPOSE OF BAIL VS. THE RIGHT OF ATTACHMENT
No matter how damning the evidence against an accused may
appear,41 there remains in the- American criminal justice system
the presumption of the accused's innocence.42 Until proven guilty,
succumb "to the dubious remedy of encampment at the doors of both the Clerk of the Court
of Appeals... and the Clerk of this Court").
40 See supra note 5 (purpose of bail to secure defendant's presence at trial).
" See D'Aquino v. United States, 180 F.2d 271, 272 (9th Cir. 1950) ("question of the
guilt or innocence.., not an issue on application for bail"). But see M. TOBORG, PRETRIAL
RELEASE: A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES 1 (U.S. Dep't Just. 1986)
("rights of accused must be balanced against rights of community"). At least one commenta-
tor considered guilt a necessary factor in determinations of pretrial release, stating that
"[i]n the absence of any finding of possible guilt, defendants should retain as much freedom
as possible." Id.
'2 See supra note 7 (discussion of presumption of innocence).
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the accused's liberty is traditionally, if not constitutionally, guar-
anteed.4" Bail in the form of money, property, or the secured prom-
ise of another is geared toward ensuring the defendant's presence
at trial.4 Stating that "other societal objectives" outweighed the
theoretical purpose and policy behind bail,4" the Landau court
sidestepped an important right of a criminal defendant by allowing
civil plaintiffs to attach a defendant's bail funds.46 It is asserted
that any such attachment, permitted after the defendant has com-
plied with the conditions of bail, would eliminate the defendant's
incentive to appear at trial.47
Permitting forfeiture of posted bail regardless of whether or
not the defendant appears at trial dramatically alters the function
of bail.48 Instead of being an inducement for the defendant, bail is
"' See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussion of traditional recognition of
right to bail).
" See supra note 5 (discussion of bail's purpose); see also United States v. Melville,
309 F. Supp. 824, 826-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (bail is "catalyst" for and "guarantee" of defend-
ant's appearance); M. TOBIAS & R. PErSEN, supra note 10, at 345 (sole standard of
whether or not to grant bail is likelihood of defendant's flight).
11 See Landau, 895 F.2d at 892. Contra L. WEINREB, supra note 3, at 53 ("burden of the
societal objectives served by the criminal process should be shared instead of imposed
largely on the persons who are accused") (emphasis added).
The Landau court was particularly concerned about crime victims. See Landau, 895
F.2d at 891-92. The court noted that it had "no doubt" that the district court sympathized
with the plight of crime victims, but criticized the district court's finding that "the purposes
... outweighed even victims' rights." Id. The Second Circuit's criticism of the district court
seems misplaced, however, when viewed in light of the Tenth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Jones, 567 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1977). The Jones court noted that "[ain action to
enforce a bond forfeiture, even if considered civil in nature, is a case arising under the crimi-
nal laws and is governed by the rules of criminal procedure." Id. at 967. The reason for this
rule is that the bond came into existence as part of the criminal proceeding and hence must
be governed accordingly. See id.
4 See supra notes 7-8.
' While the district court predicted a reduction in incentive, see Landau, 723 F. Supp.
at 220 ("[a]ny rule which makes it less likely that the defendant will recover ball reduces
this incentive and undermines the purpose of bail"), it is suggested that since the rule will
affect only those likely to flee (i.e., the guilty), the incentive has effectively been removed in
its entirety. See United States v. Badger, 711 F. Supp. 1008, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1989). The
Badger court questioned, "what incentive remains for the defendant to appear for trial," if
such a levy were permitted. Id.; see also supra note 5 (discussion of purpose of bail).
48 See Badger, 711 F. Supp. at 1009 ("[s]upervision over the ball system lies within the
inherent power of a court to call an accused to answer a criminal complaint and stand
trial"). Expresging its fierce distaste for a rule permitting a levy on bail, the Badger court
stated that to permit the IRS's levy would "impermissibly threaten[ ] the institutional in-
tegrity of the Judicial Branch." Id. (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383
(1989)). To permit a levy by the IRS, the Badger court further urged, would be inequitable,
since the court has "condition[ed] [defendant's] release on the deposit of a refundable bail
bond, only to turn the money over to the IRS upon his surrender." Id.; see also Reed Mktg.
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relegated to the role of a collection device, 49 as well as an unin-
tended, but powerful prosecutorial weapon. For example, if bail
funds are subject to attachment, a defendant may be pressured
into accepting a disfavorable plea bargain in exchange for reduced
bail.50 Thus, the defendant may possibly forego trial and the op-
portunity to clear his name in return for a reduction in the amount
of his funds left vulnerable to attachment.
Under Landau, a "[civil] plaintiff's right to seek a provisional
remedy granted by state law" supersedes the federally prescribed
right to pre-trial release on bail.51 The right to attach a defendant's
assets under New York law,52 however, is considered a "harsh"' 3
Corp. v. Diversified Mktg., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 125, 126 (N.D. Ill. 1976) ("very purposes" of
bail would be lost if defendant were aware he might not recover bail even if he complied
with terms). But see Bankers' Mortgage Co. v. McComb, 60 F.2d 218, 221 (10th Cir. 1932)
(garnishment of bail bonds within trial court's discretion). The Bankers' Mortgage court
believed that when the purpose of the court's custody of bail has been satisfied, "garnish-
ment will not interrupt the progress of judicial proceedings in such court nor invade its
jurisdiction." Id. The court reasoned that since it is holding bail "not for the law but for the
person entitled thereto," it is for the court to decide who is "entitled thereto." Id. The
Bankers' Mortgage decision, however, was rejected by the district court in Landau for being
"to a large extent flawed." Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 220; see also Corporation Co. v. Mikelis,
467 F. Supp. 826, 827 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (rejecting Bankers' Mortgage holding).
49 See Badger, 711 F. Supp. at 1009 (IRS may not use court and its powers over bail as
"quasi-collection agency"); American Exch. Life Ins. Co. v. Putnicki, 510 F. Supp. 19, 21
(W.D. Tex. 1980) ("the law" forbids use of court as "collection agency"); Reed, 419 F. Supp.
at 126. The Reed court warned "that the transformation of the federal courts into collection
agencies for judgment creditors would impede the judicial function." Id.
50 See generally STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 3.11, at 103-04 (American Bar Ass'n, Spec'l Comm. on Prosecution and Defense
Functions 1971) (quoting ABA STANDARDS, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.1) (discussing when plea
bargaining is proper). Plea bargaining is only sanctioned "[iln cases in which it appears that
the interest of the public in the effective administration of criminal justice . . . would
thereby be served." Id. However, plea discussions generally are encouraged under the proper
circumstances by penologists who contend that disposing of a case through plea bargaining
can aid chances for rehabilitation and limit the burden on society. Id. at 102.
51 See Landau, 895 F.2d at 892 n.3. The Landau court did not believe that "the possi-
ble added risk of flight could ever outweigh" a civil plaintiff's right to a state law remedy.
Id. In United States v. Jones, 567 F.2d 965, 967 (10th Cir. 1977), overruled in, United States
v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414 (10th Cir. 1984), however, it was held that the provisional remedy
of bond forfeiture, "even if considered civil in nature, is ... governed by the rules of crimi-
nal procedure." Id. It is submitted that the view presented by the Jones court, which distin-
guished bail as a criminal law creation from attachment as a civil law creation, thereby
rejecting the Landau court's preference for civil plaintiffs, is the better view.
52 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 6202 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1990). Under New York
law, the debt or property against which an attachment may be sought includes any debt or
property "against which a money judgment may be enforced." Id. More specifically, this
includes "any property which could be assigned or transferred, whether it consists of a pre-
sent or future right or interest and whether or not it is vested, unless it is exempt from
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and "extraordinary remedy."" The right to a prejudgment attach-
ment of a defendant's assets is entirely statutory,55 wholly discre-
tionary,56 and without a counterpart in the common law. 7
Attachment is generally regarded as a "last resort," provi-
sional remedy to be "strictly construed in favor of those against
whom it may be applied,""8 and should not be employed where al-
ternatives exist.5 9 Bail bond forfeiture, by the same token, is en-
application to the satisfaction of the judgment." Id. 5201(a). See generally Note, Attach-
ment in New York-A Cumbersome Legal Tool?, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 308, 308-12 (1955)
(noting New York's particularly stern approach to this "drastic" remedy). Section 5205 of
New York's CPLR, which sets forth those items that are non-attachable, fails to include bail
deposits. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 5205 (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1990). The list, how-
ever, is not exhaustive and the fact that items such as one's television set and food for a
week are included, illustrates the rather "bare bones" nature of the list, and indicates that
the drafters did not intend to cover such complex situations as court-held funds. Id.
11 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch Futures Inc. v. Kelly, 585 F. Supp. 1245, 1259 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (" 'harsh' remedy not lightly... granted"); Reading & Bates Corp. v. National Iranian
Oil Co., 478 F. Supp. 724, 726 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("harsh remedy which should be construed
strictly against those seeking to use it"); First Nat'l Bank v. Highland Hardwoods, 98
A.D.2d 924, 926, 471 N.Y.S.2d 360, 362 (3d Dep't 1983) (considered "harsh remedy").
" See, e.g., Elliot v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 11 Misc. 2d 133, 135, 171 N.Y.S.2d 217,
219 (N.Y.C. City Ct. Spec. T. Bronx County 1957), aff'd, 11 Misc. 2d 136, 179 N.Y.S. 2d 127,
129 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1958) ("extraordinary" nature of attachment demands that
it be "carefully circumscribed"); Reich v. Spiegel, 208 Misc. 225, 230, 140 N.Y.S.2d 722, 726
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955) ("extraordinary remedy").
55 Siegel v. Northern Blvd. & 80th St. Corp., 31 A.D.2d 182, 183, 295 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806
(1st Dep't 1968) (attachment "is strictly a creature of statute"); Valentine Dolls, Inc. v.
McMillan, 25 Misc. 2d 551, 551, 202 N.Y.S.2d 620, 622 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1960) (same);
Salm v. Krieg, 182 Misc. 721, 724, 49 N.Y.S.2d 694, 697-98 (Columbia County Ct. 1944)
(same). In addition, state attachment statutes are binding on federal courts, pursuant to
Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIv. P. 64; see United States v.
Sinclair, 347 F. Supp. 1129, 1136 (D. Del. 1972).
" See Reading & Bates, 478 F. Supp. at 726 (attachment within trial court's discre-
tion). Attachment has been held to be so harsh that even when a plaintiff complies with the
letter of the statute, courts may refuse to grant the remedy. See Merrill Lynch, 585 F. Supp.
at 1259.
11 See In re Dukes, 276 F. 724, 725 (D. Del. 1921) (no attachment of debt at common
law). Attachment originated "in the customs of London." Id. In one of its forms, the process
of attachment can be traced to merchant and admiralty law. See Property Research Fin.
Corp. v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 419, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233, 237 (2d Dist. 1972).
11 P.T. Wanderer Assoc. v. Talcott Comm., 111 A.D.2d 55, 56, 489 N.Y.S.2d 179, 180
(1st Dep't 1985); First Nat'l Bank v. Highland Hardwoods, Inc., 98 A.D.2d 924, 926, 471
N.Y.S.2d 360, 362 (3d Dep't 1983).
5 See Harland, Monetary Remedies for the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of
the Criminal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REv. 52, 64-77 (1982). Alternatives exist for the plaintiff
in Landau and other plaintiffs similarly situated, such as federally-supported crime victims'
funds and privately-run crime victims' organizations. See id. In addition, the defendant's
court-held funds are not forever immune; the plaintiff can wait until the criminal defendant
has had his bail returned and then properly seek attachment. See Landau, 723 F. Supp. at
219-20; cf. In re Catton, 86 Bankr. 561, 563 (Bankr. D. Ill. 1988) (once court-held property is
BAL AND THE CIVIL PLAINTIFF
tirely statutory and is to be strictly construed in favor of the de-
positor.8 0 It is suggested that in light of the fact that both the
attachment and bail statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of
the one who potentially could be forced to part with bail, the Lan-
dau court has misconstrued these statutes to reach a desired
result.
Relying on its decision in Jacobson v. Hahn,'6 1 the Landau
court insisted that "the door to attachment of bail has always been
open."82 The statutes in question in Jacobson, however, provided
that a defendant's cash, paid in lieu of bail, could be used to sat-
isfy fines.63 The Jacobson court, then, considered the defendant's
cash bond as an available asset, rather than bail qua bail.8 4 It is
asserted, therefore, that the rationale of Jacobson is wholly inap-
plicable to the facts of Landau, as that is no longer the law. It is
further submitted that the Landau court erroneously blended the
civil remedy of attachment with the criminal defendant's right to
bail to achieve its aim of aiding civil plaintiffs, even at the expense
of rendering bail's existence in our criminal justice system
meaningless.
II. THE NATURE OF BAIL
A. The Contractual Nature of Bail
The arrangement whereby a criminal defendant posts bail as a
condition for his release is, in essence, a contract between the de-
"awarded to the [debtor] [it] is then treated like any other property").
"o See State v. Fish, 747 P.2d 956, 959 (Okla. 1987) (forfeiture only granted "when re-
quired by clear statutory language"); see also FED. R. CraM. P. 46(a)(8)(II).
88 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1937).
62 Landau, 895 F.2d at 897. Contra Interpetrol Bermuda Ltd. v. Trinidad and Tobago
Oil Co., 135 Misc. 2d 160, 168, 513 N.Y.S.2d 598, 604 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987) (attach-
ment must not be granted freely since "it 'runs counter to the fundamental common-law
concept that before depriving a party of his property, opportunity for hearing should be
offered'" (quoting Reich v. Spiegel, 208 Misc. 225, 230, 140 N.Y.S.2d 722, 726 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1955))).
" See Jacobson v. Hahn, 14 F. Supp. 339, 343 (N.D.N.Y. 1936) (application of bonds in
lieu of bail for fines proper because they are "conclusively presumed to belong to the de-
fendant"), modified on appeal, 88 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1937).
6 Id. In Jacobson, the question was whether the defendant actually had owned the
cash bonds deposited in lieu of bail. See id. The IRS sought to levy on the bonds but was
denied recovery by the Second Circuit, which resolved the ownership issue in favor of the
defendant's friends who had loaned him the money. See Jacobson, 88 F.2d at 435. In Jacob-
son, the Second Circuit never raised the issue of the court's authority because its decision
was governed entirely by statute. See id. at 435 ("section 15, title 6, U.S.C.A.").
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fendant and the government.6 5 In exchange for the defendant's ap-
pearance in court, it follows that this contractual arrangement
should provide for a guaranteed return of his posted funds.6 It is
suggested, however, that the Landau court overlooked the contrac-
tual nature of bail.
The defendant's obligation under the bail contract is to appear
in court, while the government's obligation is to release the bail
funds to the defendant upon the performance of his obligation.6 7
The defendant would violate this arrangement, for example, if he
failed to appear at trial, or where he obtained bail fraudulently or
illegally. 8 Bail statutes provide for forfeiture in such cases because
the defendant has not satisfied his obligation under the contract.6 '
The Landau court, it would appear, viewed the defendant's very
characterization as a criminal as being tantamount to a breach of
the bail contract. The court stated that because the plaintiff "al-
legedly suffered her losses in a scheme serious enough to warrant
criminal prosecution,"7 0 attachment is proper regardless of the de-
fendant's compliance with all of his obligations under the bail con-
tract.' It is suggested that the court, which was aware of the "full
16 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 687, 688 (5th Cir. 1979) ("clerk of court
holds the cash bail under the terms of a specific agreement"); United States v. Miller, 539
F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1976) (bail bond "is nothing more than a contract between the gov-
ernment ... and a principal and his surety"); Heine v. United States, 135 F.2d 914, 917 (6th
Cir. 1943) (bail arrangement is contractual); United States v. Powell, 492 F. Supp. 1030,
1031 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (bail is held under terms of contract), aff'd, 639 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
Unit A Mar. 1981).
66 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(f). Rule 46(f) provides that "[w]hen the condition of the
bond has been satisfied ... the court shall... release any bail." Id.; see Powell, 492 F. Supp.
at 1032 (once defendant has appeared "the contract has been fulfilled, so the funds should
be returned to the defendant"); Heine, 135 F.2d at 917 (bonds deposited in connection with
bail must be returned upon fulfillment of bond's obligation); see also Chancer v. Chancer,
308 N.Y. 204, 209, 124 N.E.2d 283, 285 (1954) ("[tlhere could be no violation of condition
maturing payment of bail, provided that defendant rendered himself amenable to proceed-
ings"). The Powell court went so far as to declare the right of return upon compliance with
the bond's conditions to be within the "mandatory" language of Rule 46(f). Powell, 639 F.2d
at 225.
67 See supra notes 64-66.
66 See supra note 35.
69 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a)(8)(II), (e)(1); see also United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d
687, 688 (5th Cir. 1979) ("only purpose to be served in requiring a cash deposit is to make it
available to satisfy a forfeiture in the event of a willful default of the principal"); United
States v. Lujan, 589 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir. 1978) (court may only require forfeiture of bail
upon breach of bail contract), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919 (1979).
70 See Landau, 895 F.2d at 892.
71 See id. at 892-93.
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range of provisional remedies" available for civil plaintiffs, 2 rele-
gated the contract of bail to a mere deposit of money.73
B. The Doctrine of Custodia Legis
The United States Supreme Court's decision in The Lot-
tawanna74 is often cited to support the court's refusal to allow at-
tachment of court-held funds under the custodia legis doctrine. 75
In The Lottawanna, a libel suit involving the proceeds from a
court-ordered sale of a vessel, the Court held that funds in cus-
todia legis were immune from attachment.7 6 The Court maintained
that funds deposited with the court were to be held strictly for the
purposes for which they had been deposited and disposed of "to
whom [the funds] . .. may belong."'7
The New York courts depart slightly from a "wholly immune"
approach to the attachment of funds in custodia legis.75 Neverthe-
less, as the Second Circuit stated in Clarkson v. Shaheen,79 this
72 See id. at 892.
7' See United States v. Nebbia, 357 F.2d 303, 304 (2d Cir. 1966) ("Rule [46 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure] as interpreted in this Circuit requires more than the
mere deposit of cash"); see also supra note 5 (discussing purpose of bail).
7' 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 201 (1873).
7 See, e.g., In re Casco Chem. Co., 335 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1964) (court found "ab-
solute stranglehold of the Clerk on funds in the Registry," based on The Lottawanna); Cor-
poration Co. v. Mikelis, 467 F. Supp. 826, 827 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (The Lottawanna decision
mandates denial of attachment of court-held funds).
Sovereign immunity is another ground for denial of bail attachment that courts have
asserted. See, e.g., American Exch. Life Ins. Co. v. Putnicki, 510 F. Supp. 19, 20-21 (W.D.
Tex. 1980) (action to attach bail barred by sovereign immunity); Mikelis, 467 F. Supp. at
828 (no waiver of sovereign immunity for attachment of bail bonds).
The Landau court disregarded sovereign immunity as a basis for denial of bail attach-
ment because the government has no interest in the money. See Landau, 895 F.2d at 893. It
is submitted that the court's rejection of the sovereign immunity argument was well-
founded. In The Lottawanna, it was stated that funds deposited in the Court's registry were
neither "in the hands of the clerk nor of the judge." The Lottawanna, 87 U.S. at 224. It has
also been held that there is an important distinction to be made between payment into
court and a deposit into court. See Schmidt v. Chamberlain of New York, 266 N.Y. 225, 230,
194 N.E. 685, 686 (1935) (treasurer not permitted to act with court-held funds, since depos-
ited with, and not paid to, court); In re Johnson's Estate, 186 Misc. 469, 471-72, 57 N.Y.S.2d
71, 72 (Sur. Ct. New York County 1945) (deposit different from payment because court
merely has custody of deposit).
71 See The Lottawanna, 87 U.S. at 224-25.
7 See id. at 224.
78 See Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 716 F.2d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 1983). The Clarkson court
warned that "the right under New York law to attach property in the custody of the court is
limited." Id.
79 Id.
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departure from the general rule should be permitted sparingly and
only "to an extent not inconsistent with the purpose for which the
fund was created." 80 Clearly, bail was not created to satisfy the po-
tential claims of civil plaintiffs.8' It is asserted, therefore, that the
Landau court misinterpreted Clarkson and The Lottawanna deci-
sions to support the proposition that a court is free to release
court-held funds for any purpose when, in fact, those decisions rec-
ognized that a court's power to release those funds is limited by
the purpose for which they were deposited with the court in the
first place.82
The Second Circuit's unusual approach to bail as expressed in
Landau is echoed in the United States District Court of Hawaii's
decision in Bank of Hawaii v. Benchwick.83 In Bank of Hawaii, the
80 See id. at 130 (construing In re Leikind, 22 N.Y.2d 346, 239 N.E.2d 550, 292
N.Y.S.2d 681 (1968)). In Clarkson, judgment creditors attempted to levy stock of a judg-
ment debtor after the district court took the stock into its custody for the benefit of another
judgment creditor. See id. at 127. "[O]nce the shares came into the custody of the court for
[plaintiff's] benefit, no subsequent activity could give third parties a superior claim." Id. at
129.
81 Cf. Chancer v. Chancer, 308 N.Y. 204, 210, 124 N.E.2d 283, 285 (1954) (bail for de-
fendant's appearance at trial not alimony). The Chancer court stated that the "giving of
bail.., could not be upon terms which would enable the application of the bail to purposes
other than those [statutorily] contemplated." Id. The Chancer court further noted that the
discretionary authority of a court to dispose of funds deposited with it "does not invest the
court with an arbitrary or unlimited discretion concerning what shall be done with such
funds." Id. at 207, 124 N.E.2d at 284. The court also stressed that the purpose of bail is to
"render [defendant] ... amenable to [proceedings]." Id. at 211, 124 N.E.2d at 285.
82 Landau, 895 F.2d at 895. The Landau court, relying on dictum in The Lottawanna,
stated:
[T]he admiralty court could not have considered the state-court attachment
"[b]ecause the fund, from its very nature, is not subject to attachment either by
the process of foreign attachment or of garnishment." [citing The Lottawanna, 87
U.S. at 224] . . . . It acknowledged elsewhere in its opinion, however, that
"[s]upplemental suits in the nature of a suit in rem may unquestionably be enter-
tained in favor of parties having an interest in the proceeds. . . ." Therefore, the
Court did not identify a general rule precluding actions against funds held in the
registry.
Id. (citations omitted). It is suggested that the Landau court's discussion regarding the
plaintiff's interest in the proceeds is, as the court itself suggested, too remote for application
of the Lottawanna dictum on which it relied. See id. at 895-96; cf. Bank of Hawaii v.
Benchwick, 249 F. Supp. 74, 83-84 (D. Haw. 1966) (bank worker embezzled funds from bank
which he used for bail and bank allowed to attach because of its "interest" in bail funds).
" 249 F. Supp. 74 (D. Haw. 1966). The Bank of Hawaii court relied on the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Bankers' Mortgage Co. v. McComb, 60 F.2d 218, 220-21 (10th Cir.
1932). See Bank of Hawaii, 249 F. Supp. at 82-83. In Bankers' Mortgage, the court carved
out an exception carefully tailored to the facts of the case regarding an assignment of
surety-procured bail by a defendant to his attorney. See Bankers' Mortgage, 60 F.2d at 220-
21. This decision has been both criticized and rejected. See, e.g., Landau, 723 F. Supp. at
1990] BAIL AND THE CIVIL PLAINTIFF
court allowed a civil plaintiff to attach a criminal defendant's bail
where the defendant's admission and the evidence produced at his
trial established that the funds the defendant posted for bail had
been embezzled from the plaintiff.8 4 In Bank of Hawaii, then, "the
claim asserted [wa]s ownership of the very funds posted as collat-
eral, '8 5 not whether a criminal defendant's right to bail should be
disturbed by a civil plaintiff's alleged monetary injury."" In Lan-
dau, the propriety of the funds posted as bail was not at issue.
The Bank of Hawaii court focused on a court's discretionary
power to release its funds and bend the custodia legis doctrine as
justice requires.8 8 It is suggested, however, that the impropriiety of
the funds posted as bail should have been the sole factor upon
which the Bank of Hawaii decision turned. Accordingly, it is sub-
mitted that the Landau court erroneously relied on Bank of Ha-
waii-a decision whose outcome the Second Circuit may have de-
sired, but a decision which nonetheless is factually distinguishable
from Landau and wrongly premised on the discretion of a court to
abandon the custodia legis doctrine for justice's sake.
III. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF BAIL ATTACHMENT
In the event a defendant is able to raise bail, the Landau rule
will discourage him from appearing at trial or complying with
220 (rejecting); Corporation Co. v. Mikelis, 467 F. Supp. 826, 828 (S.D. Fla. 1979)
(criticizing).
U See Bank of Hawaii, 249 F. Supp. at 83-84.
11 See Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 219.
86 See id. The Bank of Hawaii court granted attachment of the defendant's bail to the
plaintiff bank, "notwithstanding the paucity of specific precedent, [because] the power of
this [c]ourt to render more effective justice must surely not be lacking." See Bank of Ha-
waii, 249 F. Supp. at 80 (court agreeing with plaintiff Bank of Hawaii's argument). The
court granted this relief because the-defendant admitted that the money posted was the
plaintiff's property. See id. at 83.
17 See Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 219. The Second Circuit, however, implied that there
was some impropriety as to the source of the funds. See Landau, 895 F.2d at 891, 893. The
court stated that it was "not 'comfortable with the notion of indicted defendants using
funds that may be the fruits of their crimes as bail.'" Id. at 891. Expressing concern that a
thief should not be allowed to post bail with that which he stole, the court declared that
"[n]o criminal defendant should be able to post property as bail without its owner's con-
sent." Id. at 893. The court then hypothesized that "[i]f plaintiff's allegations are true, then
defendant's net worth increased, in part, by the amount of her losses." Id. This argument,
however, departs from the findings of the district court. See Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 219.
The district court stated in its findings of fact that the plaintiff had not asserted an interest
in the actual bail. Id. It is suggested that the Second Circuit's argument has stretched the
concept of "interest" to the point of absurdity.
"s See Bank of Hawaii, 249 F. Supp. at 77.
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other conditions of his bail.89 The Landau court realized that its
decision diminishes the incentive ordinarily associated with bail, 0
but maintained that the defendant may lose his bail on other
grounds, 1 and that sufficient incentives still remains for the de-
fendant to appear at trial, such as to avoid contempt or bail-jump-
ing charges.2 These contentions, however, are only consequentially
related to a defendant's potential loss of his bail and are, therefore,
irrelevant to the defendant's right to a return of his bail funds
when he has not acted improperly.9 3 It is suggested that the Sec-
ond Circuit's reasoning in this area is flawed because nowhere has
it been suggested that the primary reason a defendant returns to
court following his pretrial release is to recover the posted funds.
The only reason, however, for requiring the defendant to post bail
is to secure his appearance at court-the reverse of this argument
does not an argument make.
Courts have recognized that a rule permitting bail attachment
undoubtedly would decrease a defendant's ability to obtain bail.94
" See Landau, 895 F.2d at 890 (it "may reduce the incentive to return to trial"); Lan-
dau, 723 F. Supp. at 220 ("decreased likelihood" of getting bail back will make it "less
likely" that defendant will appear at trial); Reed Mktg. Corp. v. Diversified Mktg., Inc., 419
F. Supp. 125, 126 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (goal of bail, to have defendant return, undermined by
attachment); cf. United States v. Badger, 711 F. Supp. 1008, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (court
refused to allow IRS to levy cash bail bond of defendant even after defendant appeared for
trial because to do otherwise would remove incentive of defendant to appear at trial).
90 See Landau, 895 F.2d at 893.
91 See id. The court noted, for example, that bail could be forfeited due to the impro-
priety of the posted assets. Id; see supra note 36. The Landau court's illustrations of how a
defendant might lose his bail involve either illegality as to the source of the funds or a
statutory mandate as a sanction for wrongful acts of the defendant. See id. Landau, there-
fore, is factually distinguishable from these decisions, because the plaintiff in Landau
merely complained of fraud and did not allege impropriety with regard to the actual bail
funds themselves, nor was there a question raised by the district court as to the legality of
the bail posted. See Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 219; see .also supra note 87 and accompanying
text (discussion of inconsistent conclusions of district court and Second Circuit on source of
funds and Second Circuit's interpretation of term "interest").
92 See Landau, 895 F.2d at 892. The Landau court argued that denying attachment
"presumes that every criminal defendant would react similarly to a diminished expectation
in the return of bail." Id. The district court, which was not concerned that every defendant
would respond negatively to the rule, but rather that it would happen at all, stated that the
very awareness of the rule would make it "that much less likely [for the defendant] to ap-
pear at the criminal proceeding." See Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 220.
" For a similar view, see Reed, 419 F. Supp. at 126. The Reed court believed that the
additional sanctions a court may impose on a bail-jumping defendant "would not eliminate
the adverse impact [of bail attachment] on the effectiveness of this bond system." Id.
1 See Landau, 895 F.2d at 890; Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 220; Reed, 419 F. Supp. at
126; cf. United States v. Davis, 135 F.2d 1013, 1014 (2d Cir. 1943) (court recognized that
allowing interference with bail to satisfy fine "may hinder accused in their search to procure
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Where a defendant is unable to raise bail independently and thus
must seek the assistance of a friend, relative, or loan institution,
the third party aware of this attachment rule may refuse to help
the defendant because of the profoundly diminished likelihood of
the return of its funds."' This increased difficulty in obtaining bail
could lead to further crowding of the already overpopulated jails.96
The Landau court recognized these possibilities and proposed that
the judge who sets bail could consider the amount of damages a
criminal defendant might face in a related civil suit.97 It is submit-
ted, however, that such a practice would be too speculative to have
any real effect and that a court's damages estimate would subse-
quently rise to a level beyond which a defendant could afford or be
willing to forfeit. Should the Landau approach be adopted even to
a limited degree, the attachment rule will eat away at the funda-
mental nature and purpose of bail." It is suggested that the Sec-
ond Circuit's decision to permit bail attachment is unsound from a
legal and philosophical perspective, and that the criminal justice
system will suffer as a result.
cash bail," but that statute in effect at that time permitted such interference).
11 See Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 220. Many criminal defendants are indigent and must
seek help from a third party. See U.S. TASK FORCE, supra note 2. To make it more difficult
for defendants to obtain bail could amount to a denial of equal protection. See J. GOLDKAMP
& M. GOrTFREDSON, POLICY GUIDELINES FOR BAIL 16 (1985). The district court in Landau
was well aware of a criminal defendant's rights and looked to the effect on future defend-
ants' attempts to secure bail when it declined to permit bail attachment. See Landau, 723
F. Supp. at 220. It is submitted that the Second Circuit was over-consumed with the needs
of the civil plaintiff and overlooked the ramifications of its decision on future criminal
defendants.
J1 .GOLDKAMP & M. GOTTFREDSON, supra note 95, at 20 (discussing "shortcomings of
bail reform" as responsible for jail overcrowding); Sviridoff, Bail Bonds and Cash Alterna-
tives: The Influence of "Discounts" on Bail-Making in New York City, 11 JUST. SYs. J. 131,
146 (1986) (expressing concern that "[w]ith the jails ... overflowing virtually year-round,
new options for the orderly and equitable release of defendants held on bail should be rigor-
ously explored"). The jail overcrowding problem appears to be "a criminal justice problem
of considerable moment," and has "reached a state of urgency." See J. GOLDKAMP & M.
GOTTREDSON, supra note 95, at 24.
' See Landau, 895 F.2d at 892 n.3.
See Landau, 723 F. Supp. at 220. The bail system is not unassailable, and, in fact,
questions as to its effectiveness and utility are plentiful. See J. GOLDKAMP & M. GOTrFRED-
SON, supra note 95, at 12-14. Bail nonetheless remains a stronghold in our criminal justice
system, undergoing occasional reforms in the hope of making it more effective. See id. On
the other hand, one commentator predicts the demise of bail in the not too distant future.
See W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 254 (1976).
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CONCLUSION
In an attempt to aid the often arduous plight of the civil
plaintiff seeking prejudgment attachment of a defendant's assets,
the Second Circuit has blindly permitted an unwarranted interfer-
ence with a criminal defendant's right to bail. As a result, the pri-
mary purpose of bail has been undermined to help an individual
for whom alternatives exist and to whom the present solution
adopted by the Landau court, traditionally has been denied. While
the Landau court's intentions in undermining the bail system may
have been well meaning, the fact remains that bail is a crucial com-
ponent of our criminal justice system. The courts have a duty to
uphold that system and further its aims, notwithstanding the per-
ceived needs of plaintiffs in related civil proceedings.
Felice B. Galant
